Short Sight in Extensive Games
The paper introduces a class of games in extensive form where players take strategic decisions while not having access to the terminal histories of the game, hence being unable to solve it by standard backwards induction. This class of games is studied along two directions: first, by providing an appropriate refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept, a corresponding extension of the backwards induction algorithm and an equilibrium existence theorem; second, by showing that these games are a well-behaved subclass of a class of games with possibly unaware players recently studied in the literature.[Full Paper]
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