The following is a very brief description of my postdoctoral work and Ph.D. work.
On my current postdoctoral position, I work on the EPSRC project titled Solving Parity Games in Theory and Practice led by Sven Schewe. The ultimate goal of the project is to solve the long-standing open problem of finding a polynomial time algorithm for determining the winner of a parity game. Solving these games is of importance to automated verification, as the problem of model checking modal mu-calculus reduces to it.
I worked with Krzysztof Apt and Guido Schäfer on various games that are played on graphs, such as coordination games and network creation games. This topic also relates to some of my work on auctions, to matching theory, and to certain combinatorial optimization problems (in particular set cover problems). In the WADAM lab at Sapienza University of Rome, I worked within two research projects on practical approximation algorithms and complex networks. My work in these projects was on algorithmic mechanism design, in particular on posted price mechanisms, double auctions, and trading mechanisms.
The central theme of my Ph.D. research was on algorithmic problems related to externalities and, in general, "other-regarding behavior" in algorithmic game theory. I studied a rather wide variety of games and theoretical models that all relate to the aforementioned theme, and investigated various algorithmic properties of these models.
Note: The list below is ordered reverse-chronologically and covers all types of publications (i.e., conference papers, journal papers, technical reports, theses and maybe more).
Tomasz Janus, Bart de Keijzer: On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games. Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2017. [pdf] [bibtex]
Tomasz Janus, Bart de Keijzer: On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games. ArXiv Technical Report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Stefano Turchetta: Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade. Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2017. [pdf] [bibtex]
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Stefano Turchetta: Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade. ArXiv Technical Report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Turchetta: Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions. Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) 2017. [pdf] [bibtex]
Krzysztof R. Apt, Bart de Keijzer, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer, Sunil Simon: Coordination Games on Graphs. International Journal of Game Theory. [pdf][bibtex]
Krzysztof R. Apt, Bart de Keijzer, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer, Sunil Simon: Coordination Games on Graphs. ArXiv Technical Report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Riccardo Colini Baldeschi, Paul Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Turchetta: Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions. Arxiv Technical Report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Irving van Heuven van Staereling, Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer: The Ground-Set-Cost Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem. Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS) 2016. [pdf] [bibtex]
Riccardo Colini Baldeschi, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Stefano Turchetta: Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance. Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 2016. [pdf] [bibtex]
José Correa, Bart de Keijzer, Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz: The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games. Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2015. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis: The Strong Price of Anarchy of Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. Theory of Computing Systems. [pdf] [bibtex]
Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi: Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations. Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2015. [pdf] [bibtex]
Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi: Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations. Arxiv Technical Report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer: Cooperation and Externalities in Algorithmic Game Theory. Ph.D. thesis. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: My Ph.D. advisor is Guido Schäfer. The members of the thesis committee are Krzysztof R. Apt, Edith Elkind, Stefano Leonardi, Leen Stougie, and Éva Tardos. The thesis was defended at VU University on june 16, 2014.
Bart de Keijzer, Tomas B. Klos, Yingqian Zhang: Finding Optimal Solutions for Voting Game Design Problems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. [pdf] [bibtex] This is a journal-article adaptation of my master's thesis.
Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer: Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy. Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC). [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Haris Aziz: Shapley Meets Shapley. Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS) 2014. [pdf] [bibtex] This is a conference paper based on the 2013 ArXiv technical report with the same name, listed below.
Bart de Keijzer, Krzysztof R. Apt: The H-index can be Easily Manipulated. Bulletin of the EATCS. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Evangelos Markakis, >Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis: Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions. European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA) 2013. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: The ArXiv report titled On the Inefficiency of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions that is also listed here is a more extensive version of this paper. I recommend you read that instead.
Aris Anagnostopoulos, Luca Becchetti, Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer: Inefficiency of Games with Social Context. Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2013. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis: On the Inefficiency of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Krzysztof R. Apt: The H-index can be Easily Manipulated. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: This report is equivalent to the EATCS publication with the same title (listed above).
Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer: Shapley Meets Shapley. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer: Housing Markets with Indifferences: A Tale of Two Mechanisms. Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2012. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer: Finding Social Optima in Congestion Games with Positive Externalities. European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA) 2012. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer, Tomas B. Klos, Yingqian Zhang: Solving Weighted Voting Game Design Problems Optimally: Representations, Synthesis, and Enumeration. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer: Complexity of Coalition Structure Generation. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer: The Robust Price of Anarchy of Altruistic Games. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex]
Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer: Complexity of Coalition Structure Generation. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS) 2011. [pdf] [bibtex]
Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer: The Robust Price of Anarchy of Altruistic Games. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) 2011. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: The ArXiv report with the same name that is also listed here is a much more extensive version of this paper. I recommend you read that instead.
Bart de Keijzer, Tomas Klos, Yingqian Zhang: Enumeration and exact design of weighted voting games. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS) 2010. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: This paper is basically a concise version of a part of the paper "Solving Weighted Voting Game Design Problems Optimally: Representations, Synthesis, and Enumeration", listed above. I recommend you read that paper instead.
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis: On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2010. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer: On the Design and Synthesis of Voting Games: Exact Solutions for the Inverse Problem. Master's thesis. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: My advisors for my master's thesis are Tomas Klos and Yingqian Zhang. I wrote my thesis in the Algorithmics group at Delft University of Technology. Another note: The paper "Solving Weighted Voting Game Design Problems Optimally: Representations, Synthesis, and Enumeration" that is listed above contains all results of this thesis, is more concise, and presents everything in a better way. I recommend you read that instead.
Bart de Keijzer, Sylvain Bouveret, Tomas B. Klos, Yingqian Zhang: On the Complexity of Efficiency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences. Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT) 2009. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer: A Survey on the Computation of Power Indices. Literature survey. [pdf] [bibtex]
Bart de Keijzer: Three New Complexity Results for Resource Allocation Problems. ArXiv technical report. [pdf] [bibtex] Note: First paper ever. Possibly contains some typos. Many (but not all) of the results in this manuscript are discussed much more clearly in the paper "On the Complexity of Efficiency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences" that is also listed (and downloadable) here. So reading that one instead of this one is recommended.
Email:
keijzer at liverpool dot ac dot uk
or
bdekeijzer at gmail dot com
(pick either one)
University of Liverpool
Verification Group, office: M237
Ashton Building, Ashton Street
L69 3BX Liverpool
United Kingdom